This paper suggests a method for implementing the theoretical relative profit difference test for intensity of competition due to Boone (2008) . An empirical illustration is given for banking systems in emerging economies
Introduction
There is interest in measuring the strength of competition in different industries. One strand argues that the intensity of competition alters the relationships between the profitability of firms because output is reallocated towards more efficient firms when intensity of competition increases. Boone (2008) developed this idea of the output reallocation effect into a theoretical test, and this paper suggests a procedure for implementing Boone's test, illustrated with a sample of banks in emerging economies.
Theory
Boone (2008) describes an industry where firms compete but differ in efficiency.
Initially the firms decide whether to enter the market and then, knowing which firms entered in the first stage, all firms choose strategically to maximise their after entry profits. A sub-game perfect equilibrium is identified where profits are related to the firm's efficiency, and are conditional on the aggressiveness of the firms' conduct. Let ( ) denote the profit level of a firm with efficiency level . Consider three firms with different efficiency levels: max ≥ ′ ≥ min The inverse relative profit difference (RPD), , represents the ratio of the difference between the profit of the typical firm and the profit of the least efficient firm relative to the difference between the profit of the most efficient and the profit of the least efficient firm:
Boone (2008) argues that more intense competition causes the term , the RPD, to fall as the intensity of competition increases. Hence the numerator term is expected to fall more than the denominator; the intuition is that when an industry becomes more competitive firms are punished more harshly the more they are below maximum efficiency, Boone (2008 Boone ( :1246 .
Boone establishes a relationship between the relative profit difference, which he calls normalised profits and the corresponding normalised efficiency, symbolised here as : In principle therefore the test is straightforward but requires comparison of the areas under sample scatters of points, i.e. empirical distributions. The discriminating index amongst different competitive regimes need not be related to time, t; it could also refer to different regions, or industrial sectors. For example in an industry panel data case study, write as the measured cost efficiency of firm i at time t. Rank the efficiency scores for a related group of firms from highest max to lowest: min and normalising the efficiency scores, construct the following sample points.
This variable measures, for each firm observation, the relative efficiency compared to the least efficient firm, normalised by the range of efficiency scores. Associated with each of these normalised efficiency scores will be a relative profit difference observation:
The sign version of the test therefore is given by the sign of the difference in the definite integrals computed for two different competition regimes, A and B:
Sample procedure
The efficiency scores could be computed by stochastic frontier analysis. The basic data are firm observations on efficiency, and a measure of profitability, transformed as in [3] , [4] . Plot these for all pooled observations. A way of implementing the test is the use of polynomial quantile regression analysis (PQR).
Since this is an empirical integral it is appropriate to use it to estimate a theoretical integral. A PQR is based on the parameters the probability level for isolating the proportion of the sample lying on or below the quantile regression line and the degree of the polynomial. The choice is a compromise between inclusivity of sample points and avoidance of undue outlier impact. Fitting a PQR at the third quartile for a given selection of sample points for example ensures that 75 percent of those sample points lie on or below the fitted line. We suggest that the preferred specification of the PQR should be the one with positive first derivative and negative second derivative over the largest part of the domain of normalised efficiency.
Therefore approximate the relationship between the inverse relative profit difference and the normalised cost efficiency by:
This polynomial quantile regression produces an integral estimate which is a linear function of the quantile regression coefficients:
Here the � terms are the estimated coefficients from the quantile regression and the vector ′ is given by �1, From the variance matrix of the estimated coefficients compute the standard error of this integral:
For two competition regimes (B: before or benchmark and A: after or alternative) the hypothesis of no difference in the intensity of competition is:
This can be tested by the use of intercept and slope dummy variables applied to the pooled sample.
The PQR form with these dummy variables is:
Then, for the benchmark and the alternative regimes, test: 0 : ∆= ′ = 0 by using the Wald statistic for one restriction:
Empirical example
We illustrate with a sample of banking systems in emerging economies: 485 banks in 34 emerging economies over the period 2005-2008 collated from the Bankscope database, see Duygun et al (2013) . The banks were the largest in each country and passed filter tests including deposits exceeding loans in order to focus on the commercial banks only.
Using the variables: costs, outputs, i.e. loans, securities and off-balance sheet income, input prices, i.e. price of funds, labour and fixed assets, equity capital and time, we derived a stochastic frontier analysis efficiency measure by estimating the short run total cost function. The error component model includes idiosyncratic error and inefficiency, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) . In our example of banks in emerging countries we have derived cost efficiency measures for each bank in each country at time , for a range of different efficiency measurement methodologies and measures of profitability, such as net interest margin, return on assets, return on equity and shadow return on equity capital. Using Braeutigam and Daughety (1983) and
Hughes et al (2001), we interpret the negative of the elasticity of cost with respect to equity capital as the shadow return on equity. There is a strong argument for using this measure of profitability since it reflects the banks' attitude to the riskiness of their loan portfolios.
We then proceeded by sorting and normalising the data on efficiency and profitability in order to calculate the normalised efficiency and the relative profit In the test illustrated here, we focus on a particular part of the sample, the banks in economies preparing for EU and eventual Eurozone entry. There are 10 banking systems 2 in this subsample comprising 496 observations. The annual convergence criteria reports of the European Central Bank, ECB (1996 ECB ( -2014 , confirm that from 2004 onwards these countries were engaged in restructuring their banking systems in anticipation of accession to the EU and adoption of the Euro, therefore they represent a subsample of market participants likely to display increasing competitive pressures in an environment where each is opening up to similar external deregulation incentives.
In selecting this subsample for measuring increased competition through the impact on the profit-efficiency relationship we must avoid confusing the picture with the effect 1 Normalised efficiency observations are in the unit interval, but sample data for RPD need not be. 
